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The Rise and fall of a New Type of Crime against Humanity: the Crime against 
Humanity of Forced Marriage 
 





The practice of forced marriage rose as a new crime against humanity in the case law of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, but it has had a short and contentious life, being abandoned after a few years by other 
international criminal tribunals. This paper is devoted to the study of the international case law established 
by the international criminal tribunals -Special Court for Sierra Leone, and International Criminal Court- that 
have heard cases where allegations of force marriage have been raised up. 
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International conventional law had never address crimes of sexual nature as a separate category of crime 
against humanity or crime of war before the signature of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with 
the exception of the crime of rape. But the astonishing news of crimes of sexual nature carried against women in the 
conflicts of the former Yugoslavia 2 and Rwanda 3.  
                                                             
1 Lawyer, PhD in International Law, Calle Gorgos nº 11, 33b. 46021 Valencia, Spain.  mtorres@dalmoconsulting.com, phone nº 
+34 96 394 3410, Fax nº +34 96 352 1287 
2 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights with the task to investigate 
human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia, in particular, highlighted in his report that “Rape is an abuse of power and control in 
which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the victim. In all his reports, the Special Rapporteur has emphasized the variety of 
methods which are used to achieve ethnic cleansing. Rape is one of these methods, as has been stated for the outset. In this context, rape has been used not 
only as an attack on the individual victim, but is intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the entire ethnic group. There are reliable reports of 
public rapes, for example, in from of a whole village, designed to terrorize the population and force ethnic groups to flee”. NU. doc. A/48/92-
S/25341 (1993), Report on the situation of Human Rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeuszm 
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/S-1/1 of 14 
August 1992, p. 20-21. 
3 The amended indictment in the first case heard on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Case nºICTR-96-4. 
Akayesu) alleged that “between April 7 and the end of June, 1994, hundreds of civilians (hereinafter "displaced civilians") sought refuge at the 
bureau communal. The majority of these displaced civilians were Tutsi. While seeking refuge at the bureau communal, female displaced civilians were 
regularly taken by armed local militia and/or communal police and subjected to sexual violence, and/or beaten on or near the bureau communal 
premises. Displaced civilians were also murdered frequently on or near the bureau communal premises. Many women were forced to endure multiple acts of 
sexual violence which were at times committed by more than one assailant. These acts of sexual violence were generally accompanied by explicit threats of 
death or bodily harm. The female displaced civilians lived in constant fear and their physical and psychological health deteriorated as a result of the sexual 
violence and beatings and killings”. 
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Shocked and outraged the International Community leading to the establishment of international criminal 
tribunals that not only explicitly incorporated rape as a crime against humanity in their statutes 4 but also issued several 
indictments relating to sexual violence, and convicted one defendant of genocide, including as a result of sexual 
violence5. The case law established by both tribunals led to important developments that were included in the debates 
of the Preparatory Committees for the Rome Conference between 1996 and 1998, as well as in the Conference of 
Rome itself, highlightening the major problem about prosecuting crimes of sexual nature: the inexistence of a separate 
and autonomous category of crimes of sexual nature in the Statutes of the international criminal tribunals 6. 
 
Breaking grounds in that matter, the Preparatory Committee, on its December 1997 session, included an 
autonomous category on crimes of sexual nature in the project of Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
both under crimes of war and crimes against humanity. Therefore, the Statute of the ICC became the first 
international instrument to contain that figure, constituting one of the most significant contributions of the Rome 
Statute to the development of tipification of crimes under international law.  
 
Article 7.1.g) of the Rome Statute 7 states that: 
 
“1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;”. 
 
In other hand, Article 8.2.b) (xxii) and 8.2.e) (vi) of the Rome Statute states that:  
 
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means: 
b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions; 
e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the 
established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced 
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions;”. 
 
To this day, Tribunals have only contemplate in their proceedings the crimes of rape, sexual slavery and 
sexual violence 8, being the more conflictual one the crime of sexual slavery in relation to which we have 










                                                             
4 Article 5 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and article 3 of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 
5 Akayesu trial. Vide note 2. 
6 See, among other: HEALEY, S. A. (1995), “Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 21, 327-383; and KOVALOVSKA, A. (1997). “Rape of Muslim Women in 
Wartime Bosnia”, ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 3, 931-945. 
7 Available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-
9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf 
8 BOU FRANCH, V. (2012). Los crímenes sexuales en la jurisprudencia internacional, Revista electrónica de estudios 
internacionales, 24, 1-44. 




II. The Rise Of The Crime Against Humanity Of Forced Marriage In The Case Law Of The Special Court 
For Sierra Leone.  
 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone9 was set up in 2002 as the result of a request to the United Nations in 
2000 by the Government of Sierra Leone for "a special court" to address serious crimes against civilians and UN 
peacekeepers committed during the country's civil war 10. 
 
Article 2 g) of the Statute established that:  
 
“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population: g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of 
sexual violence”.  
 
Based on such provision, the SCSL was the first international tribunal to heard cases where the indictments 
contemplated the practice of so-called “forced marriages” as a crime against humanity, describing such practice as:  
 
“(The) so-called «forced marriages» involved the forceful abduction of girls and women from their homes or other places of refuge 
and their detention with the AFRC troops as they attacked and moved through various districts. The girls and women were taken against 
their will as «wives» by individual rebels. The evidence showed that the relationship of the perpetrators to their «wives» was one of ownership 
and involved the exercise of control by the perpetrator over the victim, including control of the victim’s sexuality, her movements and her 
labour, for example, the «wife» was expected to carry the rebel’s possessions as they moved from one location to the next, to cook for him 
and to wash his clothes. Similarly, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the use of the term «wife» by the perpetrator in reference to the victim 
is indicative of the intent of the perpetrator to exercise ownership over the victim, and not an intent to assume a marital or quasi-marital 
status with the victim in the sense of establishing mutual obligations inherent in a husband wife relationship. In fact, while the relationship 
of the rebels to their «wives» was generally one of exclusive ownership, the victim could be passed on or given to another rebel at the discretion 
of the perpetrator” 11. 
 
But its legal definition has been highly controversial.  
 
 
1. The initial qualification of “forced marriages” as a part of the crime of sexual slavery: The AFRC Case and 
Sentence. 
 
The first problems with the legal definition raised with the Indictment presented by the Office of the 
Prosecutor in the AFRC Case. This case involved the judgment of three young officers who played key roles in the 
government of Sierra Leone and military responsibilities under different titles, after the 1997 coup that established by 
Mr. Koroma as President of Sierra Leone. The Prosecutor sustained that the practice of “forced marriages” had to be 
qualified as a crime against humanity of sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence (count 7-article 2.g. of 
the Statute) and as a crime against humanity of other inhumane act (count 8-article 2.i. of the Statute), or in the 
alternative as a crime or war of outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of article 3 common to the Geneva 





                                                             
9 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone was annexed to the Agreement between the United Nations and the 
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed on 16 January 2002. UN. doc. 
S/2000/914.  
10 UN. doc. S/2000/786, Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council.  
11 Para. 711 of the Judgement of Trial Chamber II of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the case Prosecutor against Alex 
Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, case no. SCSL-2004-16, of 20th June 2007 (hereinafter, AFRC 
Judgement).  
12 Amended Consolidated Indictment in the case no. SCSL-2004-16, the Prosecutor against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy 
Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, para. 51-57. 
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Trial Chamber II considered that count 7 (sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence) “was duplex 
and defective in as far as it does not enable the accused persons to know precisely which of the two crimes (sexual slavery or sexual violence) 
they should be defending themselves against” 13. For such defect, the Trial Chamber found by majority that the count should 
be dismissed in its entirety14.  
 
But more controversial was the qualification of the practice of “forced marriages” as a crime against humanity 
of other inhumane acts in count 8. It is consolidated case law of international criminal tribunals that the category of 
crimes against humanity of other inhumane acts is a residual clause, meaning that it covers a broad range of acts not 
explicitly enumerated as crimes against humanity but of similar gravity. Under those grounds, the Trial Chamber II 
considered that it was a category that must be restrictively interpreted as applying only to acts of a non-sexual nature 
amounting to an affront to human dignity and that comply with three additional requirements: 
 
“In addition to the chapeau requirements of Crimes against Humanity pursuant to Article 2 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber 
adopts the following elements of the crime of other inhumane acts:  
 
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act;  
2. The act was of a gravity similar to the acts referred to in Article 2(a) to (h) of the Statute; and 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the gravity of the act” 15. 
 
Entering into the consideration of “forced marriages” as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts, 
the parties sustained different positions. The Prosecutor submitted that this crime had its own distinctive features and 
was sufficiently serious to qualify as an inhumane act. He claimed it consisted of words or other conduct intended to 
confer a status of marriage by force or threat of force or coercion distinct from sexual acts, even if this acts usually 
involved sex. At the same time, it was considered that sexual slavery did not necessarily amount to forced marriage. 
Thus, forced marriage as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts could include sexual violence or slavery, 
but it involved distinct elements as well 16.  The Defence of Mr. Kanu sustained that the so-called practice of “forced 
marriages” could not be qualified as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts as it was not of a similar gravity 
to the acts referred in Article 2 of the Statute. The Defence contended that if this practice could not be categorized as 
sexual slavery, the conduct would not constituted a crime against humanity 17.   
 
Having heard all the arguments and evidences, Trial Chamber II sustained that is was not satisfied that the 
evidence was capable of establishing the elements of a non-sexual crime of “forced marriage” independent of the 
crime of sexual slavery18, so it was necessary to consider that category and its elements. The Trial Chamber II found 
by majority 19 that the totally of the evidence presented for the “forced marriage” practices went to proof of elements 
subsumed by the crime of sexual slavery, and added that the use of the term “wife” by the perpetrators in reference to 
the victim was indicative of the intent of the perpetrator to exercise ownership over the victim, and not an intent to 
assume marital or quasi-marital status with the victim 20. Therefore, there did not exist a lacuna in the law which 
would necessitate a separate crime of “force marriage” as an other inhumane act 21.  
 
As a result of the previous finding declaring count 7 as a duplicate, the Trial Chamber II went on to finally 
consider the evidence of sexual slavery under count 9 (outrages upon personal dignity), qualifying such acts as a crime 
under Article 3 of the Statute 22.  
 
 
                                                             
13 Para. 94 AFRC Judgement.  
14 Justice Doherty signed a Partly Dissenting Opinion on count 7 (sexual slavery) and count 8 (forced marriages).  
15 Para. 698 AFRC Judgement.  
16 Ibid. para. 701 and para. 1009-1012 of the Prosecution Final Brief in the AFRC Case.  
17 Para. 702 AFRC Judgement.  
18 Ibid. para. 704. 
19 Partly Dissenting Opinion of Justice Doherty on count 7 (sexual slavery) and count 8 (forced marriages).  
20 Para. 711 AFRC Judgement.  
21 Ibid. para. 713. 
22 The Statute of the SCSL did not contain a provision defining sexual slavery as a crime of was. Therefore, in the following case 
law, the practice of forced marriages fell under the scope of the crime of war of outrages upon personal dignity.  




2. The rise of the distinction between “sexual slavery” and “forced marriages”: The AFRC Appeal Sentence 
and the RUF Case.  
 
The AFRC Sentence was appeal both by the defense and the Prosecutor, which allowed the Appeals 
Chamber to reconsider some of the decisions taken by the Trial Chamber, mainly the dismissal of count 7 and the 
dismissal of “force marriages” as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts (count 8) 23. The AFRC Appeals 
Sentence, regarding the dismissal of count 7 on the grounds of duplicity, hold that count 7, indeed, violated the rule 
against duplicity that applies to international criminal tribunals. But, it hold that the solution was not the dismissal of 
the count in its entirety, but to proceed on the basis that the offence of sexual slavery had been properly charged in 
count 7 and struck out the charge of “any other form of sexual violence” 24. 
 
Regarding the Trial Chamber's dismissal of Count 8 of the Indictment ("other Inhumane Acts") for 
redundancy, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred in law by finding that the category of “other 
inhumane acts” had to be restrictively interpreted. Furthermore, it did not see a reason justifying why the “exhaustive” 
listing of sexual crimes under Article 2.g. of the Statute should foreclose the possibility of charging as "Other 
Inhumane Acts" crimes which may among others have a sexual or gender component.  The Trial Chamber therefore 
erred in finding that Article 2.i. of the Statute excludes sexual crimes 25. The Appeals Chamber continued holding that 
the trial record contained ample evidence that the perpetrators of forced marriage intended to impose a forced 
conjugal association upon the victims rather than exercise an ownership interest and that forced marriage is not 
predominantly a sexual crime 26. Analyzing the Prosecutor appeal ground, the Appeals Chamber concluded that:  
 
“Based on the evidence on record, the Appeals Chamber finds that no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage 
was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. While forced marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as 
non-consensual sex and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing factors. First, forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a 
person by force or threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal 
association with another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike 
sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the «husband» and «wife», which could lead to disciplinary 
consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. These distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual crime. 
The Trial Chamber, therefore, erred in holding that the evidence of forced marriages is subsumed in the elements of sexual slavery.  
 
In light of the distinctions between forced marriage and sexual slavery, the Appeals Chamber finds that in the context of the 
Sierra Leone conflict, forced marriage describes a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or those of someone for 
whose actions he is responsible, compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner resulting in severe 
suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury to the victim” 27. 
 
As to the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, those practices amounting to forced marriages were of similar 
gravity to several of the crimes against humanity enumerated in the Statute 28 and the forceful abduction and use of 
women and girls as forced conjugal partners as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian 





                                                             
23Judgement of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the case Prosecutor against Alex Tamba Brima, 
Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, case no. SCSL-2004-16, of 22nd February 2008 (hereinafter, AFRC Appeals 
Judgement).  
24 Para. 103 and 109 of the AFRC Appeals Judgement.  
25 Ibid. para. 185-186.  
26 Ibid. para. 190.  
27 Ibid. para. 195-196. 
28 Para. 200.  
29 Para. 202. 
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The distinction established by the Appeals Chamber was followed by the Prosecutor Office in the RUF Case 
presenting an indictment that charged the accused with the commission of crimes against humanity of sexual slavery, 
crimes against humanity of other inhumane acts and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol II (outrages upon personal dignity) with the aim of covering all the criminal aspects involved in 
the practice of forced marriages 30.  
 
The RUF Case involved the judgment of three former commanders of the Revolutionary United Front for 
their role in the civil war which ended in 1999. In the original indictment against the former rebels, two further 
accused, Foday Saybana Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, were charged with war crimes and crimes humanity, but their 
indictments were withdrawn following their deaths in 2003. On the matter of “forced marriages” and the possibility 
on entering cumulative convictions, the Trial Chamber I in the RUF Sentence stated that:  
 
“The Chamber considers that the crime charged under Count 8 (‘forced marriage’) as an “other inhumane act” requires a distinct 
element from the crime of rape (Count 6), and viceversa. The offence of rape requires sexual penetration, whereas ‘forced marriage’ requires 
a forced conjugal association based on exclusivity between the perpetrator and victim. 
Therefore, the Chamber finds that it is permissible to convict on both counts. 
(…). 
The Chamber considers that the conduct charged under Count 8 is distinct from the charges of sexual slavery under Count 7 
(sexual slavery). The Appeals Chamber has explicitly held that ‘forced marriage’ is not subsumed by sexual slavery. The distinct elements 
are a forced conjugal association based on exclusivity between the perpetrator and victim. Therefore a conviction on both Counts 7 (sexual 
slavery) and 8 (other inhumane acts) is permissible”31. 
 
As such, these case law established the rise of a new crime against humanity of other inhumane acts resultant 
of the practices of “forced marriages” that had never been typified in any international treaty or defined in previous 
case law. But this interpretation of sexual slavery and forced marriages as different crimes has been criticized by a part 
of the scholarly studying international crimes, as it tends to interpret “sexual slavery” in a very restrictive manner that, 
at the end, alters the elements of the crime as established both in the case law and the Statute of the ICC 32.  
 
 
3. The fall of the distinction between sexual slavery and “forced marriages”: The Taylor Case. 
 
The SCSL case law qualifying “forced marriages” both as a crime against humanity of sexual slavery and of 
other inhumane acts, had a short life with the ruling in the last case heard by the Court: the case in the Prosecutor 
against Charles Ghankay Taylor, former President of Liberia 33. The change can be explained by two simple facts. 
First, the change in the direction of the Office of the Prosecutor 34. And second, the Trial Chamber which heard the 
case was Trial Chamber II 35.  
 
The indictment in the Taylor Case meant a change in the Prosecutors Office tactics, as it contemplate that the 
practices of “forced marriages” could only be charged as crimes against humanity of sexual slavery (count 5) and 
violations of common Article 3 (outrages upon personal dignity-count 6) 36. The count regarding the separate crime 
against humanity of other inhumane acts disappeared.  
                                                             
30 Amended Consolidated Indictment in the case Prosecutor against Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case 
No. SCL-04-15.  
31 Para. 2206-2207 of the Judgement of Trial Chamber I in the case Prosecutor against Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCL-04-15, of 2nd March 2009 (RUF Judgement, hereinafter). 
32 Vide, BOU FRANCH, V. (2014). Los crímenes sexuales en la jurisprudencia internacional. Revista Electrónica de Estudios 
Internacionales, 24, 34; PALMER, A. (2009). An Evolutionary Analysis of Gender-Based War Crimes and the Continued 
Tolerance of «Forced Marriage». Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 7, 1-26; GONG-GERSHOWITH, J. 
(2009). Forced Marriage: A «New» Crime Against Humanity? Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, 8, 1-24.  
33 HELLER, K. J. (2013). The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 11/4, 
835-855. 
34 In February 2010, the Secretary General of United Nations had appointed Ms. Brenda J. Hollis, as Chief Prosecutor of the 
Special Court.  
35 The Trial Chamber II was the chamber judging the AFRC case in first instance in which it was affirmed that the practices of 
forced marriages was completely covered by the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.  
36 Second Amended Indictment in the Caste Prosecutor against Charles Taylor, SCSL-03-01-PT-263, 29 May 2007. 




The Trial Chamber II did not miss the opportunity of reclaiming its previous rulings highlighting the 
disappearance of the count of “forced marriages” 37, criticizing the practice followed in the AFRC Case by the Office 
of the Prosecutor and its negativity to adopt the remedy suggested by Judge Julia Sebutinde for the defect of duplicity 
38. 
 
The Chamber went on criticizing what it called the “erroneous pleadings” of the Prosecution with regard to 
various forms of sexual violence. In the Trial Chamber's view, the Prosecution erred in various indictments by 
charging "forced marriage" as a crime that falls within the scope of the crime against humanity of other inhumane 
acts. It highlighted that the dissenting opinion in the AFRC Judgment of Justice Doherty had observed that "the 
abduction of girls and their coercion into marital unions, as described by the Prosecution expert and by witnesses, is not the same nor 
comparable to arranged or traditional marriages" and that the crucial element of "forced marriage" to be "the imposition, by 
threat or physical force arising from the perpetrator's words or other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the perpetrator over the 
victim" 39. The Chamber took into account the Concurrent Opinion of Justice Sebutinde in the AFRC Case stating that 
the practice of “forced marriages” could be described as “the forceful abduction and holding in captivity of women and girls 
(«bush wives») against their will, for purposes of sexual gratification of their «bush husbands» and for gender-specific forms of labour 
including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes (conjugal duties)”40, to finally and unanimously declared that “the sexual and non-
sexual acts involved in this forced conjugal association cannot be considered separately as they are integrated in this form of abuse”. Adding 
that, in the Trial Chamber's view, the term "forced marriage" was “a misnomer for the forced conjugal association that was 
imposed on women and girls in the circumstances of armed conflict, and which involved both sexual slavery and forced labour in the form of 
domestic work such as cooking and cleaning” 41. 
 
Aiming to refute the case law laid down by the Appeals Chamber in the AFRC Appeals Judgement and the 
RUF Case, the Trial Chamber II started its analysis of the now-called “forced conjugal association” affirming that this 
practice satisfies the two elements required by the crime of sexual slavery; that is, deprivation of liberty and the non-
consensual sexual acts. And as such, it should rather be considered a conjugal form of enslavement.  For Trial 
Chamber II, these “forced conjugal associations” constituted a form of enslavement in that the perpetrator exercised 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over their "bush wives" and imposed on them a deprivation of liberty, 
causing them to engage in sexual acts as well as other acts 42. Finally, the Chamber declared:  
 
“The Trial Chamber is of the view that the conjugal slavery best describes these acts, and while they may constitute more than 
sexual slavery, they nevertheless satisfy the elements of sexual slavery” 43. Therefore, the Trial Chamber II concluded opposing to 
the rise of a new type of crime against humanity of other inhumane acts for such loathsome acts:  
 
“The Trial Chamber considers that part of the confusion created by the Prosecution’s charge of «forced marriage» was its 
presentation as the conceptualization of a new crime. In light of the above considerations, the Trial Chamber considers that conjugal slavery 
is better conceptualized as a distinctive form of the crime of sexual slavery, with the additional component described by the Appeals 
Chamber. However, the Trial Chamber is of the view that this additional component, which relates to forced conjugal labour, is simply a 
descriptive component of a distinctive form of sexual slavery. It is not a definitional element of a new crime, in the same way that gang rape 
is a distinctive form of rape, yet nevertheless falls within the scope of the crime of rape. 
 
 
                                                             
37 “The Trial Chamber notes that in this case, unlike the AFRC case and the RUF case, «forced marriage» is not charged in the Indictment. 
Nevertheless, the evidence adduced by the Prosecution under the charges related to Sexual Violence includes extensive testimony by women and girls 
regarding forced conjugal association to which they were subjected. In the absence of the charge of «forced marriage», the Trial Chamber has considered this 
evidence with regard to the charges in the Indictment, as well as the past jurisprudence of the SCSL with regard to this issue”. Judgement in the case 
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, 18th May 2012, para. 422 (hereinafter, Taylor Judgement). 
38 Para. 93 of AFRC Judgement and para. 423 of Taylor Judgement.  
39 Para. 423 of Taylor Judgement.   
40 Concurring Opinion of Justice Sebutinde in the AFRC Case, para.12. 
41 Para. 424-425 of Taylor Judgement. 
42 Para. 427 Taylor Judgement.  
43 Para. 428 Taylor Judgement.  
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The Trial Chamber considers that unlike the concept of «forced marriage», as it was presented by the Prosecution in the AFRC 
and other cases before this Court, conjugal slavery is not a new crime with additional elements. Rather it is a practice with certain 
additional and distinctive features that relate to the conjugal aspects of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, such as the 
claim by the perpetrator to a particular victim as his «wife» and the exercise of exclusive sexual control over her, barring others from sexual 
access to the victim, as well as the compulsion of the victim to perform domestic work such as cooking and cleaning. In the Trial Chamber’s 
view, these are not new elements that require the conceptualization of a new crime” 44. 
 
The Taylor Judgement was appealed but none of the parties presented grounds related to the qualification of 
“forced marriages” or “forced conjugal association” as crimes against humanity of sexual slavery, excluding its 
qualification as crimes against humanity of “other inhumane acts”. The Appeals Chamber wisely did not enter into its 
consideration.  
 
III. The Treatment Of “Forced Marriages” By Other International Criminal Tribunals After The Special 
Court For Sierra Leone Special Case Law.  
 
The International Criminal Court has started investigation in two situations involving sexual slavery both as a 
crime against humanity and as a crime of war: the situation in Uganda 45 and the situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, but only in one of the cases brought about the Democratic Republic of Congo 46 have been discussed 
practices of “forced marriages”.  
 
In the case the Prosecutor against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the 
ICC confirmed the charges presented by the Office of the Prosecutor, allowing the case to proceed against Mr. 
Katanga and Mr. Ngudjolo Chui for the commission of several crimes jointly committed through other persons, 
among which the crime of sexual slavery, both as a crime against humanity and as a crime of war, was included 47. 
 
In this occasion, Pre Trial Chamber I confirmed that the elements of crimes to be considered in the crime of 
sexual slavery are the same whether considered a crime of war or a crime against humanity 48 and that although sexual 
slavery is included as a separate offence in the Statute, it may be regarded as a particular form of enslavement49. In its 
view: 
 
“In the view of the Chamber, sexual slavery also encompasses situations where women and girls are forced into «marriage», 
domestic servitude or other forced labour involving compulsory sexual activity, including rape, by their captors. Forms of sexual slavery can, 
for example, be practices such as the detention of women in «rape camps» or «comfort stations», forced temporary «marriages» to soldiers 
and other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel, and as such, violations of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery”50. 
 
                                                             
44 Ibid., para. 429-430. 
45 As explained by the ICC, The cases The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti and The Prosecutor v. Dominic 
Ongwen are currently being heard before Pre-Trial Chamber II. Five warrants of arrest have been issued against five top members 
of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Following the confirmation of the passing of Raska Lukwiya and Okot Odhiambo, the 
proceedings against him have been terminated. On 16 January 2015, Dominic Ongwen was surrendered to the ICC's custody and 
transferred to the ICC Detention Centre on 21 January 2015. His initial appearance took place on 26 January 2015. The opening 
of the confirmation of charges hearing in respect of Dominic Ongwen is scheduled for 21 January 2016. On 6 February 2015, 
Pre-Trial Chamber II severed the proceedings against Dominic Ongwen from the Kony et al. case. The opening of the 
confirmation of charges hearing in respect of Dominic Ongwen is scheduled for 21 January 2016 at the seat of the Court in The 
Hague, Netherlands. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti remain at large. 
46 Regarding the situation in Congo, the ICC explains that the following cases have been brought before the relevant 
Chambers: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo; The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda; The Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga; The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui; The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana; and The Prosecutor v. Sylvestre 
Mudacumura. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga and Bosco Ntaganda are currently in the custody of the ICC. Sylvestre 
Mudacumura remains at large. 
47 Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, 30 September 2008, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. Decision on the 
confirmation of charges (Katanga and Chui Decision), para.576 and 580. 
48 Ibid, para. 343 and 429. 
49 Ibid., para. 430. 
50 Ibid., para. 431. 




Therefore, Pre-Trial Chamber I considered the practices of “forced marriages” as included in the crime of 
sexual slavery, with no necessity of completing such crime with others 51. This qualification of the practice of “forced 
marriage” as a crime of sexual slavery in exclusivity came with a necessary mens rea different that the one defended by 
the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL in the AFRC Appeal Judgement: 
 
“there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that when the combatants (i) abducted women from the 
village of Bogoro, (ii) captured and imprisoned them and kept them as their «wives», and (iii) forced and threatened them to engage in 
sexual intercourse, they intended to sexually enslave the women or knew that by committing such acts, sexual enslavement would occur”52. 
 
After severing the cases 53, Trial Chamber II declared Mr. Ngudjolo Chui innocent of all charges brought 
against him 54 and continued the prosecution of Germain Katanga in a separate Trial 55. Regarding the counts of 
sexual slavery, it is to be noted that the practice of the “forced marriages” conducted in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo was on the base of the indictment of Mr. Katanga in this case.  
 
In Mr. Katanda Judgement 56, Trial Chamber II analyzed the necessary elements of crime for the crime of 
sexual slavery, focusing its analysis in the Elements of Crime Documents issued by the ICC and without changing the 
case law established by the SCSL. But, the Chamber decided to avoid any of the terms used in previous decisions, 
considering them to be injurious for the victims.  
 
The Chamber started point out that the term “wife” was used by the attackers to make their fate clear to the 
victims, obviously had, given the circumstances, a very specific meaning, which is of particular importance to its 
analysis of the crime of sexual slavery. The Chamber was of the view that “in the specific context of the immediate aftermath 
of the attack on Bogoro, the statement that someone was “taken as a wife” by a combatant or that she was to “become his wife” is a clear 
reference to a coercive environment entailing almost certain engagement in acts of a sexual nature” 57. Under this premises, the 
Chamber affirmed:  
 
                                                             
51“(…) Article 7(1)(k) of the Statute defines the conduct as «other» inhumane acts, which indicates that none of the acts constituting crimes against 
humanity according to article 7(1)(a) to (j) can be simultaneously considered as another inhumane act encompassed by article 7(1)(k) of the Statute”. 
Ibid. para. 452. 
52 Ibid., para. 435. 
53 Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court, 21 November 2012, Situation 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui. Decision on the 
implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons.  
54 “In conclusion thereafter, the Chamber considered that it could not determine beyond reasonable doubt that Mathieu Ngudjolo was, as alleged by the 
Prosecution, the leader of the Lendu combatants who participated in the attack on Bogoro. Therefore, in the Chamber’s view, the Prosecution has not 
proven beyond reasonable doubt that Mathieu Ngudjolo committed the alleged crimes under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, insofar as his role within Bedu-
Ezekere groupement, as it emerges from the evidence examined, in noway allows the Chamber to accept or even contemplate the notion of indirect 
perpetration adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber, regardless of how article25(3)(a) of the Statute is construed”. Doc. ICC-01/04-02/12. Trial 
Chamber II of the International Criminal Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Judgement of 18 December 2012 pursuant to article 74 of the Statute (Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Judgement), para. 
110; and ibid., para. 503. The Judgement was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber. Doc. ICC-01/04/-02/12 A. Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Court, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Judgment of 27 February 2015 on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber II entitled “Judgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the Statute”. 
55 Following Rule 55, Mr Katanga’s liability was to be considered on the basis of article 25(3)(d) of the Statute (complicity in the 
commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose) and no longer solely on the basis of article 25(3)(a) 
of the Statute (commission of a crime in the form of indirect co-perpetration). 
56 Doc. ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court, 7 March 2014, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. In the case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga. Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute 
(Katanga Judgement), para. 975-980. 
57 Para. 1000 Katanga Judgement.  
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“In the view of the Chamber, in the case at bar, the fact that the combatants declared that the civilians captured in Bogoro and 
brought to their [military] camps were «their wives» does show they all harboured the intention to treat the victims as if they owned them 
and obtain sexual favours from them” 58. 
 
After review the direct testimony rendered in Court, the Chamber established that all the elements of the 
crime of sexual slavery had been met 59. And for that, it affirmed: 
 
“In the light of the foregoing, the Chamber accordingly finds that the evidence establishes beyond reasonable doubt that crimes of 
sexual slavery as a war crime and a crime against humanity under articles 8(2)(e)(vi) and 7(1)(g) of the Statute were intentionally 
committed, in the aftermath of the battle of Bogoro on 24 February 2003, by combatants from camps belonging to the Ngiti militia of 
Walendu-Bindy and by others in the camps” 60. 
 
But even if the analysis was of great deep and that the Chamber considered that the commission of the 
crimes had been proved, the outcome of the Judgement was a disappointment for the victims, as Mr. Katanga was 
considered not guilty of the counts regarding sexual slavery as the Prosecutor could not prove his involvement in the 
acts 61.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion.  
 
As it has been shown, international criminal tribunals faced during the last years the challenge of typifying and 
establishing a proper reparation for the victims of a series of practices that were nominate practices of “forced 
marriage”. These practices fell under the scope of sexual crimes and gender crimes putting the eye of the international 
community in such cases that constitute a new frontier under international criminal law.  
 
The SCSL was the first tribunal to enter counts in relation to such practices but the path was not clear and 
the Prosecutor Office fell into the necessity of covering in the indictment all the acts involved in the “forced 
marriage” situations: sexual slavery, other inhumane acts, violations of common Article 3 (outrages upon personal 
dignity). The Trial Chamber issued a decision on duplicity and “forced marriage” practices were included in the 
conviction for violations of common Article 3. This qualification left the victims feeling abandoned by international 
justice, and the Office of the Prosecutor had to change its strategy. In following cases, the practices were define in the 
indictments as a particular crime against humanity of other inhumane acts, which allowed the Trial Chamber to issue a 
judgement recognizing the born of a new crime against humanity that have never been contemplated in legal texts or 
previous case law.  
 
But, the crime had a short life. After two judgements, the SCSL Trial Chamber and the Office of the 
Prosecutor came together in defining such practices as covered by the crime of sexual slavery, broadening its meaning. 
And such decision was followed by the ICC in its ruling, ending at to this point the legal controversy.  In any case, the 
rulings of SCSL and the ICC about the sexual crimes and the practices of forced marriage have brought precision and 
clarity to the elements of crime of the broader type of sexual slavery, as defined by the case law. As such, we hope that 
this new approach to sexual slavery permits the ICC to continue its work in protecting victims against such horrible 
practices, but it is still too early to assess whether the response is the necessary to obtain the objective of international 










                                                             
58 Katanga Judgement, para. 1001. 
59 Ibid., para. 1007-1008, 1012-1013, 1017-1019, 1021. 
60 Ibid., para. 1023. 
61 None of the parties appealed the Judgement in this case.  
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